Local and Moral Data in the Conflict of Laws: Terra Incognita by Ehrenzweig, Albert A.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 16 
Number 1 The Common Law and the Civil Law: 
Some Encounter, Influences and 
Comparisons—Essays in Honor and Memory of 
Arthur Lenhoff (1885-1965) 
Article 6 
10-1-1966 
Local and Moral Data in the Conflict of Laws: Terra Incognita 
Albert A. Ehrenzweig 
University of California, Berkeley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Local and Moral Data in the Conflict of Laws: Terra Incognita, 16 Buff. L. Rev. 55 
(1966). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol16/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
LOCAL AND MORAL DATA IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
TERRA INCOGNITA
ALBERT A. EHMENZWEIG*
SPOUSES John and Mary Doe, domiciliaries of the state of Domicilium, are
involved in an automobile accident in the state of Delictum. Mary sues John
in Delictum for injuries sustained as a result of John's careless driving. In
accord with the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws1 and recent judicial
authority,2 the Delictum conflicts rule calls for the application of the law of
Domicilium which has maintained the common law rule of interspousal im-
munity. John, however, fails to plead that law and the court of Delictum admits
the suit under its own statute which has abolished the immunity rule. The
court thus ignores, properly I believe,3 a presumably "applicable" foreign rule
as not relied on by either party. Can it properly do so with regard to all un-
pleaded foreign rules?
The answer is dearly in the negative since there are such rules that must
be applied ex officio.4 The line to be drawn is doubtful. The present study deals
with one category of such rules that will be analyzed as data of the forum rule.
Let us assume that Delictum has exempted from its anti-immunity statute
those foreign spouses whose domiciliary state would apply to this issue the per-
sonal law of foreign domiciliaries. In that case, whether or not John has pleaded
immunity under the law of Domicilium, Delictum will dismiss Mary's suit under
that law, provided Domicilium, notwithstanding its own common law immunity
rule, would permit interspousal suits between domiciliaries of Delictum under
the latter's anti-immunity statute. Thus, the Delictum anti-immunity statute
becomes inapplicable in Delictum by virtue of a Domicilium rule which, whether
pleaded or not, is part of the Delictum statute as a datum. Here the Domicilium
rule is not a foreign rule of decision which, only if pleaded, would displace the
forum rule as a matter of choice of law, as would the immunity rule of Domici-
ium in our first example. I have chosen the datum of reciprocity to introduce
this study, in grateful recognition of the fact that it was Arthur Lenhoff who
gave us the most incisive and comprehensive analysis of reciprocity as a "problem
of conflict of laws. ' 5
Currie must be credited with having added to American parlance the new
concept of datum.6 But this terminology, like other legal terms, including
* Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley.
1. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 390g (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
2. Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1966).
3. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws [hereinafter cited Treatise] §§ 127-29 (1962).
4. Treatise §§ 127-29. See, e.g., Gevinson v. Kirkeby-Natus Corp., 26 A.D.2d 71, 270
N.Y.S.2d 989 (1st Dep't 1966).
S. Lenhoff, Reciprocity in Function: A Problem of Conflict of Laws, Constitutional
Law, and International Law, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 44, 61-68 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 67-71, 178 (1963). The
use of the term "datum" in other meanings is older. See Judge .Learned Hand's "mediate
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characterization7 and renvoi, s would have gained greater usefulness had it been
offered with an awareness of older European learning and experience.9 This
paper is designed to establish the relationship between Currie's new concept
and its European antecedent, the "preliminary question." It also undertakes
to re-analyze Currie's concept as one concerning what I would like to call
"local data" in juxtaposition with the "moral" data of my own coinage which
I have dealt with more fully elsewhere. Finally this paper attempts to show
that both the European concept of the preliminary question and its American
counterpart should be approached in what I shall propose as a relative datum
theory.
I have spoken of moral data in those cases where forum law is automatically
applied (typically without discussion), notwithstanding the presence of foreign
elements which otherwise, under accepted rules of choice, would call for the
application of a foreign rule. Those cases apply domestic rules which are phrased
in terms of justice and equity. I have given as examples rules concerning actions
committed with "unclean hands" or "fraudulently"; actions entailing an
estoppel; rules calling for a piercing of the corporate veil on equitable grounds;
and, more generally, certain rules of restitution and much of the law of
admiralty.10 It is with this automatic reliance on the law of the forum as a
moral datum that I wish to juxtapose the seemingly automatic reference to
foreign rules as local data.
To illustrate his concept of (local) data, Currie states the case of a New
York woman claiming workmen's compensation in New York as the widow of a
deceased employee whom she married in an Italian ceremony which was invalid
under Italian law.:" If the New York compensation statute, in terms or by
virtue of judicial interpretation, refers to the lex celebrationis as determining
"widowhood" for the purposes of that statute (the widow qualified as such
under the law of the state where the alleged marriage ceremony took place),
the pertinent Italian law must indeed be ascertained ex officio as a datum of the
forum statute.
Other examples of (local) data are foreign laws referred to in such reciprocal
inheritance statutes as that of California, 12 which permits only those aliens to
data ... from whose existence may be rationally inferred the existence" of an ultimate fact.
The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1944).
7. See Ehrenzweig, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws: An Unwelcome Addition
to American Doctrine, in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 395 (1961).
8. Treatise § 116.
9. Conversely we may regret the reluctance of European theory to avail itself of its
American counterparts. See, e.g., C. David, La loi 6trang~re devant le juge du fond (1965)
who, though otherwise inclined to take Currie's theory as most representative of American
doctrine, ignores his datum theory. See id. at 70-73, 100.
10. See Ehrenzweig, Conflicts in a Nutshell § 22 (1965). See, by the same author,
Report, Uppsala Congress on Comparative Law (mimeo. ed. 1966). Another summary of
what I have there called the "lex aequitatis fori," will appear in Akrothinia, a volume honor-
ing the memory of Petros Vallindas; and an essay on the pertinent conflicts law of
admiralty in a volume honoring Charalambos Fragistas.
11. Currie, op. cit. supra note 6, at 70-71.
12. Cal. Prob. Code § 259; see, e.g., In re Estate of Larkin, 416 P.2d 473, 52 Cal.
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take whose countries offer equivalent rights to American citizens and whose
succession laws are thus an essential element, a datum, of the claimant's case;"3
or in the related rules of some countries which will grant only those adoptions
entitled to recognition in the country of nationality; 14 or in a rule excusing per-
formance on the ground of impossibility whose application may depend on
foreign prohibitions to trade with the enemy.15 Also, there is the case of a law
suit based on a Saudi-Arabian automobile accident, recovery for which was
contingent on the breach of a Saudi-Arabian rule of the road;' 6 the suit for
cancellation of a deed on the ground that a Mexican divorce was invalid under
Mexican law; 1 7 and the New York defamation suit based on the accusation
of a Brazilian crime.' s
Finally, whenever we hope to find good doctrine unencumbered by the
ballast of centuries, we should look to the law of admiralty. And, indeed, we
find admiralty courts applying such foreign rules as speed limits or pilotage re-
quirements as a matter of course, as data without recourse to choice of law
rules. Where these data are sought in the law prevailing on the high seas, they
are supplied by treaties or customary international law. Thus "carrying a white
light [and] carrying it on deck instead of [the] masthead" was determined to
be a violation of maritime law under "the law of nations" resting "upon the
common consent of civilized communities ' 19 And though in cases involving
collisions in territorial waters2° forum law may in effect prevail, it will do so
only because American courts "will take judicial notice that the other maritime
nations have adopted Rules similar to ours."2'
Awareness of the application, in certain cases, of foreign rules as data of the
domestic rule rather than as foreign rules of decision is particulary important
at this juncture in the development of American doctrine. Courts fend increas-
ingly to abandon imperative rules of choice purportedly governing certain
general categories such as contracts or torts, in favor of fragmentized decisions
of individual issues under all-serving facile formulas. Elsewhere I have tried
to show that this tendency, if carried too far, may yet cause a "counter-revolu-
Rptr. 441 (Cal. 1966); In re Estate of Chichernea, 244 Adv. Cal. App. 727, 53 Cal. Rptr.
535 (1966).
13. See Kay, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as Datum, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 47, 62 (1965).
For a similar example in French law, see Batiffol, Trait6 Elmentaire de Droit International
Priv6 No. 188 (3d ed. 1959); David, op. cit. supra note 9, at 181; and for Swedish law,
Eek, The Swedish Conflict of Laws 183 (1965).
14. Eek, op. cit. supra note 13, at 56-60. See also id. at 101, 155-58.
15. Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, [1964] Recueil des Cours II. 249.
16. Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 872 (1956). See generally Currie, op. cit. supra note 6 at 3.
17. Cf. Simpson v. Simpson, 387 S.W.2d 7,17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
18. Crashley v. Press Pub. Co, 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904).
19. The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1871).
20. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 407 (1934). The Second Restatement excludes
maritime law; see Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, Note to Institute at 194 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1964). But see Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, ch. 2 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962). On port regulations, see, e.g., Sleeper v. Puig, 22 Fed. Cas. 321 (No. 12941)
(1879); and generally 3 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 281-83 (2d ed. 1964).
21. Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty § 7-3 (1957).
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tion" that would threaten the gains achieved by yesterday's revolution against
ossified dogma.22 This threat is enhanced if the indispensable applicability of
certain foreign rules as data is questioned on the same grounds as the improper
claim to imperative application of foreign rules of decision under over-generalized
formulas of choice of law. Leading courts have vaguely felt the need for a distinc-
tion. Thus, when the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson23 pro-
claimed the return, as against a foreign guest statute, to forum law, in rejection
of the allegedly generally applicable rule of decision of the fortuitous place of
wrong, it found it necessary to reserve cases involving "standards of conduct" for
the continued regime of the lex loci delicti. Such vague formulas can only create
new confusion. 24 As Judge Van Voorhis persuasively stressed in his dissenting
opinion,25 the very guest statutes involved in that case could well be treated as
setting standards of conduct which under Judge Fuld's majority opinion are to
remain subject to the lex loci. What matters, and what must have been in the
court's mind, is the distinction between rules of decision which, like the rights
of an automobile guest, may or may not be those of a foreign state according
to the policy of the forum rule governing the particular issue (here found to
relate to the parties' reliance on the domiciliary law), and such foreign rules as
speed limits or other rules of the road which are fixed data needed for the appli-
cation of the forum rule of decision concerning liability for negligence. European
writers have drawn similar distinctions by juxtaposing foreign rules referred to
by the forum's confficts rule with those constituting "conditions" for the applica-
tion of a domestic rule2 6 or with those appearing as "facts." 27 Similarly, English
doctrine has contrasted conflicts rules with "primary rules of construction"
which are said to arise when "the choice of law is completed." 28
In drawing such distinctions we must keep in mind, however, that they are
not absolute determinants but the "relative" result of the phrasing and inter-
22. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-revolution in the Conflict of Laws? From Beale to Covers,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1966).
23. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,
752 (1963). See Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese, Comments on Bab-
cock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1963).
See also Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
24. See Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of
Torts: Law and Reason versus the Restatement Second, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 700(1963). For subsequent distressing vindications of my scepticism, see Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (Fuld, J., dissenting); Long v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1966),
per Fuld, J.; and Cashman v. Evans, 249 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
25. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 485-87, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285-87, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 752-54.
26. See, e.g., Morelli, Elementi di diritto internazionale privato § 45 (6th ed. 1959).
27. See, e.g., Morelli, fl diritto processuale internazionale § 33 (1954) ; Pau, L'attuazione
processuale delle norme italiane di DIP, 2 Scritti Perassi 187 (1957); C. David, La loi
6trang~re devant le juge du fond 72-74, 180, 184 (1965).
28. See F. A. Mann, The Primary Question of Construction and the Conflict of Laws,
79 L.Q. Rev. 525 (1963), with reference to the decisions of the House of Lords in Camille &
Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc. v. Commissioners, [1956] A.C. 39 (Eng.) ("charitable"
character of a New York foundation for British tax purposes) ; and Rae v. Lazard Invest-
ment Co. Ltd., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 555 (H.L.) (capital distribution of income from Maryland
corporation).
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pretation of the domestic rule whose displacement is sought, in the same manner
as the various solutions proposed for that favorite topic of academic discussion,
the preliminary question of European doctrine.29
Assume in our above example that the New York statute grants workmen's
compensation simply to any "widow" defined as any woman claiming to have
been validly married to the deceased. We are immediately faced with the classic
problem of whether the preliminary question of validity is to be decided separately
under a general conflicts rule of the forum relating to the validity of marriages,
or under the New York compensation rule which could well be interpreted as
satisfied with any marriage that would have been valid in New York. European
experience should caution us against attempting to solve this problem by
general, let alone "logical" 30 formulas, such as those always or usually permitting
or compelling "independent" connection of the preliminary question with a
general forum rule of choice, 31 or those always or usually referring to the conflicts
rule of the lex causae. If in our example the New York compensation act had
been interpreted as providing for any woman validly married under the law of
celebration, there would, as we have seen, have been no preliminary question to
answer, but that law would have been applied as a datum.32
Many other problem cases usually discussed in terms of preliminary ques-
tions can be used to explain and test the "relative" datum theory.33 European
conflicts rules referring to foreign nationality leave its determination, as a
"datum," to the foreign law invoked.3 4 On the other hand, we would be reluctant
to apply a similar rigid principle to our connecting factor of domicile, since our
conflicts rule or the policy of our domestic rule whose displacement is sought will
29. See Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process-
Some Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1126, 1138 n.31 (1960). See also, e.g., Van
Hoogstraten, Le droit international privm nierlandais et la question pr6alable, in De Conflictu
Legum 209, 211 (1962); Lagarde, La r~gle de conflit applicable aux questions prealables,
49 Rev. Crit. DIP 459 (1960); Voskuil, Rechtsvinding aan de band van buitenlandse
rechtsregels; vorfrage en verkregen rechten (1963).
30. Neuhaus, Die Grundbegriffe des internationalen Privatrechts 238 (1962).
31. See, e.g., Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, [1964) Recueil des Cours II. 95,
232, postulating this solution to secure uniformity of decision within the forum state. Cf.
Treatise § 188. But see (with the exception of marriage cases) Wengler, Die Vorfrage im
Kollisionsrecht, 8 Rabels Zeitschrift 148 (1934); Neuhaus, op. cit. supra note 28, at 82-89,
237-42.
32. For a pioneering study pointing in the direction of the present essay, see Kay,
supra note 11, at 60. See also M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained
and Enlightened Forum, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 845, 873 (1961).
33. For a significant example from interstate law, see Neff v. Johnson, 391 S.W.2d 760
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965), where the Texas court in denying the duty of a Texas father to
support his Ohio child under the law of Ohio, treated the question of the plaintiff's minority
as one separate from the duty to support. If the Ohio statute had referred to persons of a
specific age, the answer might have been different. For a confrontation of the German
view, as developed particularly by Wengler [e.g., supra note 311 with French doctrine, see
Francescakis, note to Wengler, Les principes ginraux du droit international priv6 et leurs
conflits, 41 Rev. Crit. DIP 595, 596 n.1 (1952).
34. See, e.g., Francescakis, Les questions priaIables de statut personnel dans le droit de
nationaliti, 23 Rabels Zeitschrift 466 (1958); Kegel, Thternationales Privatrecht § 9 11(2)
(2d ed. 1964).
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frequently require determination of domicile in specific relation to such rule or
policy, thus referring us to either the forum or foreign rule of decision. 85
We may well ask ourselves whether in the very rare cases of this kind in
which courts have resorted to a "theory" of the preliminary question, they
would and should not have reached the desired result by other means. "Gardons-
nous de chercher, dans un souci de systematization 6xag6r6, & 6chafauder sur des
cas isol~s des constructions artificielles qui ne font qu'61oigner la vie quotidienne
de son droit."-3 6 Like renvoi, this problem is one of the policy underlying the
forum rule.8 7 But it is submitted that in light of and despite this conclusion, the
datum concept can assist judicial analysis.
.35. See generally 1 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 156-59 (2d ed. 1958).
36. Van Hoogstraten, supra note 29, at 224.
37. Eek, op. cit. supra note 13, at 180.
